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In ro WHITE'S GUARDIANSHIP. 
ely. 7426. 
Sac. 5866. 
District Oourt of Appeal, Third District, 
California. 
March 29, 1948. 
I. Guardian and ward ~25 
Evidence supported probate court's or-
der terminating minor child's paternal 
grandmother's guardianship of child and 
awarding his custody to his mother on 
grounds that guardianship was no longer 
necessary. that mother was proper person 
for chi1d~s custody, and that award of cus-
tody to her was for child's best interest. 
Probate Code, § 1580, subd. 8. 
2. Guardian and ward c1P25 
The District Court of Appeal, on ap-
peal from probate court's order terminating 
minor child's paternal grandmother's guard-
ianship of child and awarding his custody 
to his mother, is bound by probate court's 
fIndings on conflicting evidence as to moth-
er's fitness for child's custody. Probate 
Code, § 1580, subd. 8. 
3. Guardian and ward ¢:::>25 
statute to remove guardian and appoint 
another guardian for any of causes men-
tioned therein. Probate Code, § 1580, 
subd.8. 
6. Guardian and ward ~25 
On mother's petition for termination 
of her minor son's guardianship by his 
paternal grandmother On ground that guard-
ianship was no longer necessary and for 
award of child's custody to petitioner on 
ground of child's welfare, probate court 
retained authority to determine what was 
for child's best interest and to. award his 
custody accordingly. Probate Code, § 1580, 
subd.8. 
7. Guardian and ward ¢:::>25 
A court having jurisdiction to grant 
letters of guardianship has jurisdiction to 
revoke them. Probate Code, § 1580, subd. 8. 
8. Guardian and ward ~25 
A probate court, appointing guardian 
of minor child's person and estate, retains 
continuing supervisory jurisdiction over 
estate's affairs and guardian's handling 
thereof, and removal of guardian for stat-
trtory reasons rests within jSuch court's 
broad discretion. Probate Code, § IS80, 
subd. 8. 
When guardianship of minor child is 9. Guardian and ward ~29 
no longer necessary, probate court, on peti- A parent or other relative of minor 
tion of child's parent for termination of child under guardian's control may seek 
guardianship, with adequate proof of peti- child's custody by petition. 
tioner's fitness for child's custOdy and best 
interest of child, may' a ward custody to such 
parent in exercise of sound discretion, and 
District Court of Appeal may not interfere 
with such determination, in absence of 
abuse of discretion. Probate Code, § 1580, 
subd. 8. 
4. Parent and child c1P2(4) 
When minor child's custody is awarded 
to one of its parents, probate court need 
not find that 'other parent is unfit for child's 
custody, but parent's unfitness must be de-
termined only when child's custody is 
awarded to another than one of its parents. 
5. Guardian and ward ~5, 27 
The probate court, which originaIly 
granted letters of guardianship of minor 
child's person and estate, is authorized by 
10. Guardian and ward <8=>25 
A probate court, which originally grant-
ed letters of guardianship of minor child's 
person and estate, retained jurisdiction to 
terminate guardianship as no longer neces-
sary and to award child's custody to his 
mother on her petition. Probate Code, § 
1580, subd. 8. 
II. Guardian and ward ~25 
The statute providing that minor ward's 
marriage or attainment of majority termin-
ates guardianship. where guardian was ap-
pointed solely because of ward's minority, 
and that, in all other cases, guardianship is 
terminated only by court's order on guard-
ian's or ward's application after notice to 
the other, is inapplicable to removal of 
guardian on petition of minor ward's par-
-
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ent for termination of guardianship and White to go overseas. The mother then 
award of child's custody to petitioner on returned to Sacramento, which was their 
grounds that guardianship is no longer former home. She received $100 per month, 
necessary and that award of custody to and sometimes more, from his compensation 
petitioner is for child's best interest. Prc>- and the Government allotment, as mainte-
bate Code, §§ 1580, subd. 8, 1590. nance for herself and their ehild. The 
Appeal from Superior Court. Sacramento 
County; Peter J. Shields, Judge. 
In the matter of the guardianship of the 
person and estate of David Theodore White, 
Jr., a minor. From an order terminating 
the minor's paternal grandmother's guard-
ianship and awarding his custody: to his 
mother, the guardian and the minor's fa-
ther appeal. 
Affirmed. 
Frank L. Murphy, of Sacramento, for 
appellants. 
Van Dyke & Harris, J. A. Montgomery 
and Leo M. FitzwilIiamj all of Sacramento, 
for respondent. 
THOMPSON, Justice. 
The paternal grandmother of David 
Theodore White, Jr., was appointed" guard-
ian of the person and estate of said minor 
child, who was two and a half years of age. 
Upon subsequent petition of the mother of 
the child, which was served on both the 
guardian and the father of the 'Child, the 
probate court terminated the guardianship, 
under Section 1580, subdivision 8, of the 
Probate ,Code, and awarded his custody to 
his mother. ,From that order both the 
guardian and the father have appealed. 
The appellants contend that the order is 
not supported by the evidence, that the court 
was without jurisdiction to terminate the 
guardianship, or to award the custody of 
the child to the mother without specifically 
finding that the father was not a fit or 
proper person to assume his custody. 
February I, 1942, David Theodore White 
and Zelma Maxine Kauffman were married. 
Soon thereafter he entered the United States 
~ilitary. service and was first st~tioned at 
Florence, South Carolina. His wife ac-
companit!d him to that place. The child in 
question was born as issue. of the marria'ge 
in 1942. The military service required Mr. 
child had no estate. The allowance was in-
sufficient for their maintenance, and the 
mother was therefore required to accept 
employment. She was then living in Sacra-
mento. To provide for care' of the child 
while the mother was working she con-
sented to the appointment of the petitioner, 
Thelma V. White, the paternal grandmoth-
er, as guardian of the person and estate of 
the minor ehild. The letters of guardian-
ship were issued January' 3, 1945. Mr. 
White returned to the United States on 
January 22, 1945, and was discharged from 
military service in July, 1945. His wife 
had been keeping company with William S. 
Mitcham. He was the father of a girl 
born to Zelma White, April 3, 1944. Mr. 
White, upon his return, procured a divorce 
from Zelma in the State of Nevada in 
June, 1945. The decree of divorce made 
no provision for the custody of the child, 
David Theodore White, Jr. Mr. White 
married another woman February 2, 1946. 
Zelma White married Mr. Mitcham July 
3, 1945. That marriage had the effect of 
legitimating their child. (Civil Code, sec. 
21S.) Mr. Mitcham and his wife Zelma 
immediately established a home at Rio 
Linda, near Sacramento, where they now 
reside. They are desirous of obtaining 
possession and custody of -her son, David. 
The petition to terminate the guardian-
ship of David and to recover his custody 
was filed .by his mother, _Zelma. in Sacra-
mento, July 11, 1946. Process was served 
on both the guardian and Mr. White, who 
appeared; answered the petition and partici-
pated in the hearing which occurred Octo:-
ber 30, 1946. Both opposed the petition and 
testified as witnesses at the hearing. Mr. 
White did not ask for the personal custody 
of the child. 
The court adopted findings favorable to 
the petitioner in accordance with the fore-
going statement of facts, determining: That 
Zelma, the mother of the child David, con-
sented to the granting of letters of guardilUl-
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ship of the child on account of the necessity 
then existing that she was obliged to accept 
employment to aid in the maintenance of 
herself and said minor; that said necessity 
for a guardian no longer exists; that Zelma 
and her present husband, Mr. Mitcham, are 
now living together in their home and are 
desirous of having the custody and control 
of the child j that, despite her previous con-
duct, the mother, Zelma, is a fit and proper 
person to have the custody, care and control 
of the minor chHd; and that it is for the 
best interest of the child that his mother, 
Zelma, should assume his custody and con-
trol. 
The court thereupon ordered that the 
letters of guardianship of the person and 
estate of the minor child, David, be re .. 
"oked and terminated. and that he be award-
ed to the custody and control of his mother, 
Zelma Maxine Mitcham. with the privilege 
granted to his father to visit him at all rea-
sonable times and places. A motion for 
new trial was denied. From the order 
terminating the guardianship and awarding 
the child to the mother, both the guardian 
and Mr. White, the father of the child, have 
appealed. 
[1,2) We are of the opinion the findings 
and order terminating the guardianship and 
awarding the custody of the child to his 
mother are adequately supported by the 
evidence. The probate court determined 
(hat guardianship of the child was no longer 
necessary, that the mother was a fit and 
proper person, to assume his custody, and 
that it was for the best interest of the child 
to award him to her custody. The fitness 
of the mother and the welfare of the child 
were direct issues in this proceeding. The 
father opposed the awarding of custody to 
Zelma, but made no application for the 
child's custody in his own behalf. We 
assume that the ,father ·was entirely fit and 
proper. While the evidence is conflicting 
regarding the fitness of the mother, we 
are bound by the findings of the court in 
that respect. We are satisfied the court did 
not abuse its discretion in determining that 
it is for the best interest of the child in 
awarding him to the custody of the mother. 
[3) When it appears that the guardian-
ship of a minor child is no longer necessary, 
the Probate Code authorizes the termina .. 
tion of his guardianship (Probate Code, 
sec. 1580, subd. 8), and upon petition there-
for, with adequate proof of the fitness of 
the parent and the best interest of the child, 
in the exercise of its sound discretion the 
court may award the custody of the child to 
such parent. In the absence of an abuse of 
discretion, lWe may not interfere with that 
determination. Guardianship of Case, 57 
Cal.App.2d 844, 135 P.2d 681; Guardian-
ship of Riley, 72 Cal.App.2d 742, 165 P.2d 
555; Guardianship of Russell, 21 Ca1.2d 
767, 772, 135 P.2d 369; Warder v. Elkins, 
38 Cal. 439, 441; Guardianship of McCoy, 
46 Ca1.App.2d 494, 116 P.2d 103; Stever v, 
Stever, 6 Cal.2d 166, 56 P.2d 1229. 
In the Riley case, supra, under circum-
stances similar to those of the present pro--
ceeding, an order terminating the guardian-
ship On the ground that "it is no longer 
necessary" and awarding the custody of the 
minor to her mother, who had previously 
consented to the guardianship, was affirmed 
on appeal. Regarding the discretion of the 
probate court to make that order, it is said, 
72 CaI.App.2d at page 747, 165 P.2d at page 
557: "Since the probate court retains con-
tinuing supervisory jurisdiction over guard-
ianship matters, the removal of a guard-
ian for any of the reasons specified in the 
code, Prob.Code, § 1580, rests within the 
broad discretion of the court, and where, 
as in the instant case, the court found that 
the mother was a fit and proper person and 
concluded that the guardianship was no 
longer necessary, the COllrt properly re .. 
moved the guardian and restored the custo-
dy of the child to her mother." 
[4) When the application for custody of 
a minor child is awarded to one of the par-
ents, it is not necessary to find that the other 
parent is unfit for its custody. The unfit-
ness of a parent of a minor child is required 
to be determined only when its custody is 
awarded to one other than its parents. 
Stever v. Stever, supra. 
[5] The probate court which originally 
grants letters of guardianship is authorized 
under Section 1580 of the Probate Code to 
remove the guardian of the person and es-
tate of a minor child and to appoint another 
person in his place, for any of the causes 
-
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cill' as J~l P.2d486 
mcntio~e(l in that section .. Guardianship of 
tlo.vard,218 Cal. 607,24 P.U 486. In the 
eaSe "last cited, in which the father of the 
child petitioned for the i discharge of the 
mother' as guardian, on the ground that she 
"removed from -this state", and to appoint. 
him in'the wife's place, the 'court said, 218 
Cal. at page 611, 24 P:Zd at page 487: "The 
power of the appointing court to direct, re .. 
strain, 'and control a guardian in the per-
formance oJ his duties, and even to remove 
him, and put another in his place, is settled 
beyond corltr8versy. However, 'the' removal 
of guardians is not an -arbitrary or capri-
dous, but a judicial, discretion, to .be exer .. 
cised with due regard' to the legal rights of 
all concerned. [Citing authoritjes.]'~ . 
[&) In !he presen\ case the mother's pe-
tition was not only based on the ground that 
the guardianship f'is no longer necessary" ~ 
but it also asked for the custody of the 
minor child on the ground of its welfare. 
The fitness of the mother and the welfare 
of the infant child were the chief issues in 
this case. The probate court retained au-
thority, upon that petition, to determine 
what was for the best interest of the child, 
and to award its custody accordingly. 
[7] In 39 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Guardian and Ward, § SOd, it is said: liThe 
court.paving jurisdiction t9 gfan~ letter~ of 
guardianship has jurisdiction' to re~oke 
them." 
[8] In !he matter at !he Guardianship 
of Russel, supra, 21 Cal.2d a·t page.7?2,. 135 
P.2d at page 371, the Supreme Court said: 
"The Probate Court retaiQs a continuing, 
~upervisory jurisdiction pver the affairs. of 
the estate and the guardian's handling there-
of.' ~nd the removal of a guardian for the 
reasons specified in the code rests within 
the broad discred.9n of that court.'" 
[9] And in 39 Corpus Juris Secundum, 
Guardia:n and Ward, § 57, it is said: "The 
parent or other relative may by petition seek 
the eusfody of the ward,' where the guardian 
has contro1." 
In the matteraf the Guardianship of Case, 
supra, the essential facts aTe similar to those 
of the present case. In that proceeding, as 
the issue of the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. 
Case, a child nainedLouis was horn in 1935. 
The mother died. 'The maternal grand-
mother took possession of the child and was 
appointed 'guardian of the person and estate 
in 1937. The father: was' then serving in the 
United States Navy. He returned to his 
home in 1940 and'laier filed a petition in the 
g'Uardianship matte',,; asking the probate 
tourt to discharge the guardian, under Sec· 
tion 1580 of !he ProhateCode, on the 
ground that 'lJ"t is no longer necessary to 
have a guardian," and also asked the court 
to a ward to him the custody. of the minor 
child. The application was contested by the 
grandmother. The court found that Uthe 
welfare of the minoT ,will best be served by 
terminating the guan,lianship and restoring 
the child!o his father," [57 Cal.App.Zd 844, 
135 P.2d &8Z] The father was found to be 
a fit and proper person. ,That order was 
made. The guardian appealed. On appeal 
the court said : .. "Wb'cit the appointment of 
a guardian for a m~nor of tender years is 
found to be necessary, such appointment is 
a duty of the, Supetior, Court. When it 
;,lppears.to the co~rt,lhat a,guardianship is 
no longer necessary for such ward the court 
must thereupon remrive' the guardian. § 
, 
1580, subd. 8, Pr.ob.Code. Inasmuch as a 
natural parent has s~pt"dor right to the eus· 
tody of his child wh'm possessed of such 
character as to mak~ him a fit custodian 
~ereof,., t1i.e,~~a.son ipr the.~ardianship of 
the minor ceases anq Jts continuance is im-
proper. In re Santos' Estate, 185 Cal. 127, 
132, 195 P. 1055. $i~ce!he father is com-
petent and has therefore the preferential 
right to have the cus~6dy of his child, even 
• r ",J ,', , " .• 
though he were .lmpe~umous, the court IS 
powerless to mainta.i~ the grandmother as 
guardian oi his pertj>n, [Citing authori-
ties.]" 'I, . 
[10] ,We conclull. that the Probate 
Court, which origin.,!l,. granted the letters 
of guardianship of t~,e:person and estate· of 
the minor child. -ret~~ed jurisdiction upon 
this petition to term~nate the guardianship 
on the ground that i~ ;was no longer neees--
sary, and to award !he custody of !he ehild 
to his mother. i: 
[11] The appell..ntscoittend that' 'the 
court was 'without 'jurisdiction to terminate 
the guardianship except upon "application . , 
'---------~---,-,,--, --------
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of the guardian or the ward." (Prob.Code, 
~ec. 1590.) That section provides: 
"( 1) Where the appointment of a guard-
;an was made solely because of the ward's 
minority, the marriage of a minor ward 
terminates the guardianship of the person; 
and the guardianship of the estate of a mi-
nor female ward is terminated upon her at-
taining majority as provided in Section 25 
of the Civil Code. 
"(Z) If the appointment of a guardian is 
made solely because of the ward's minority, 
the guardianship is terminated by his at-
taining majority. 
"( 3) In all other eases the guardianship is 
terminated only by order of the court upon 
application of the guardian or the ward, 
.fter such notice to the other as the court or 
judge may require." (Italics added.) 
\Ve think the foregoing section has no ap-
plication to the removal of a guardian, upon 
petition of a parent of a minor child on the 
grounds specified in Section 1580 of the 
Probate Code, or for the custody of the 
&::hiid by said parent. Section 1590 appar .. 
(,ntly contemp1ates only the termination of a 
guardianship of a minor when the ward 
obtains the age of majority or has married, 
in either of which events, the application 
for termination would naturally be made by 
~he guardian or the ward. That construe· 
tion is apparent, for the last subdivision of 
I..hat section provides that, under such cir-
c;umstances, the order may be made only 
"after such notice to the other." The sec-
tion makes no reference to the awarding of 
the custody of a minor to his parents on the 
ground that it is for its best interest, or 
otherwise. Naturally, the parties most in-
terested in the welfare of a minor, who is to 
be relieved of its guardianship, are the par-
ents. The termination of guardianship on 
the ground that the ward has attained ma-
jority or has married is not induded in Sec-
tion 1580. Section 1590 is confined to the 
termination of guardianships on the grounds 
mentioned therein. In the event of the sub-
sequent marriage of a ward, or the attaining 
of majority, whether he be a male or a fe-
male, it is apparent that both the guardian 
and the ward would then be qualified to ap-
ply for a termination of the guardianship 
upon giving "notice to the other." But 
when the gist of the application is for cus-
tody of an infant by a parent, for the best 
interest and welfare of the child, under such 
circumstances as exist in this case, the limit-
ed notice specified by Section 1590, to the 
guardian Or ward only, would be utterly in-
adequate since the other parent, if living, 
would be entitled to notice of that proceed-
ing. We conclude that the provisions of 
Section 1590, with respect to the parties 
who may petition for termination of a 
guardianship, and the notice there required, 
has no application to Section 1580, or to a 
petition for custody of an infant minor. 
The order terminating the guardianship 
and awarding the custody of the minor 
child, David Theodore White, Jr., to his 
mother, Zelma Ma."{ine Mitcham, is affirmed. 
ADAMS, P. J., and SCHOTTKY, J. 
pro tern., concur. 
."----~ o : 1[['1' IIUHIER SlSTtM 
T 
ZARAGOSA v. CRAVEN •• 
Cly. 7448. 
District Conrt of Appeal, Third District, 
California. 
March 30, lwa 
Hearing Granted May 27, 1948. 
I. Judgment ~93 
Final judgment on the merits in actio}, 
by husband for his injuries sustained in 
automobile collision was res judicata of is~ 
SUes of subsequent action by wife for her 
injuries and for special damages sustained 
in the same collision, and estopped wife 
from maintaining such action, since issues 
were identical, and since wife, although not 
named as a party plaintiff in husband's ac-
tion, was in privity with husband because 
of her community interest in his cause of 
action, and because, if wife recovered, hus-
band would profit to extent of his com-
munity interest in the judgment, notwith-
standing determination against him On the 
merits. Code Civ.Proc. §§ 370, 378, 3R2. 
1908. 1910; Civ.Code, ~ 164. 
'" Subsequent opinion 202 P.2d 73. 
